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End User Licence to Open Government Data? A Simulated
Penetration Attack on Two Social Survey Datasets
Mark Elliot1, Elaine Mackey2, Susan O’Shea3, Caroline Tudor4, and Keith Spicer5
In the UK, the transparency agenda is forcing data stewardship organisations to review their
dissemination policies and to consider whether to release data that is currently only available
to a restricted community of researchers under licence as open data. Here we describe the
results of a study providing evidence about the risks of such an approach via a simulated
attack on two social survey datasets. This is also the first systematic attempt to simulate a
jigsaw identification attack (one using a mashup of multiple data sources) on an anonymised
dataset. The information that we draw on is collected from multiple online data sources
and purchasable commercial data. The results indicate that such an attack against anonymised
end user licence (EUL) datasets, if converted into open datasets, is possible and therefore we
would recommend that penetration tests should be factored into any decision to make datasets
(that are about people) open.
1. Introduction
The UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) currently disseminates large numbers of
datasets under end user licence (EUL). This is a restricted dissemination of the data to
researchers who agree to a set of sixteen licence conditions and specifically agree not to
attempt to reidentify individuals. Under the transparency agenda, ONS has considered
whether some of these could be released under an Open Government Data licence. This is
effectively unrestricted publication on the Internet. This is clearly a very different level of
dissemination and therefore careful conceptual and disclosure risk analyses was necessary
in order to understand the marginal increase in disclosure risk (if any) associated with this
change in dissemination policy.
The work took place in two phases. During Phase 1 we considered the interplay of
legal and statistical definitions of confidentiality, developing a detailed understanding of
the differences in the licences and associated documents. This was essentially a socio-
legal piece of work, which in turn allowed us to generate a set of feasible scenarios that
extended beyond the orthodox intruder scenarios. Orthodox scenarios come in two
basic forms: (i) database cross match, where an intruder attempts to link records in an
identification file and a de-identified target file but does not know for certain for any
given record in the identification file whether there is any corresponding record in the
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target database, and (ii) fishing, where the intruder selects records from the target
database and attempts to find the corresponding person in the population. There are
other variants – see Elliot and Dale (1999) for a discussion – however, the critical
point is that response knowledge is not assumed. In general, it is held that, with EUL
licenses, the potential costs to a researcher of attempting reidentification (e.g., career
damage) outweigh the benefits of doing so. Therefore, even though it is possible that a
researcher might know that a third party is in the data, such intrusions are unlikely.
Under the Open Government Data (OGD) licence, the mere act of identification
would not break any rules and therefore the costs of such reidentification are simply
the effort required to carry it out. On top of this, the fact that OGD means effectively
universal access implies the very strong possibility that somebody exists who would
know that some other person was in the data (and probably for many respondents
there would be somebody with such knowledge). It is generally accepted that with
response knowledge, reidentification is considerably easier (i.e., the effort required is
considerably less). The combination of these factors makes response knowledge
scenarios far more plausible with OGD.
After a review of the report on Phase 1, ONS commissioned a Phase 2 study: a simulated
attack based on an intruder who had response knowledge that an individual was in a
dataset and then used publically available information (either openly available or available
for a fee) in order to identify that individual in the dataset. For this stage, which we report
upon here, two UK datasets were focused on: the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF). These are both microdata samples that are smaller
than one percent of the UK population and contain information on individuals and their
households. Some disclosure control has been applied, such as banding age and ethnic
group. This study builds on previous attack simulations (e.g., Mu¨ller et al. 1995; Elliot
2009) but adds an additional step of trawling for and combining available public
information (rather than simply matching two fixed datasets).
This article consists of the following sections. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on reidentification. Section 3 summarises the Phase 1 study, which describes the
motivation for the attack scenario. Section 4 describes the methodological approach to
the penetration test. Sections 5 and 6 describe the matching process and the results of
the consequential reidentification attempts. Section 7 is the general discussion.
2. Review of Reidentification Studies
Reidentification studies come in three different forms: (i) defensive studies carried out by
or on behalf of data custodians, often called penetration tests, where the goal is to assess
disclosure risk associated with a proposed data release; (ii) academic studies exploring
new attack forms or new potential anonymisation techniques; and (iii) demonstrative
studies usually carried out by data journalists and/or academics, where the point of the
study is to demonstrate that a given release is unsafe.
The earlier studies were largely of the second type. Mu¨ller et al. (1995) tested whether it
was possible to link records in the 1987 German microcensus file to an administrative
register. Results varied depending on the scenario assumed, but in general they concluded
that “although identification is not impossible, only under special circumstances are the
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chances of a successful identification larger than virtually zero”; p.149. Similarly, Elliot
and Dale (1998) showed through a study linking UK census microdata to a sample survey
that it was possible to reidentify some people by cross matching databases but that the
correct matches were effectively hidden amongst many false positive matches. Later Elliot
(2009) demonstrated that by focusing on unusual records (using the so-called fishing
attack) it was possible to achieve a higher hit rate, but he also found that the anonymisation
methods that ONS had employed in the test file (2001 census microdata) did effectively
stymie that attack.
El Emam et al. (2011) carried out a systematic review of reidentification attacks
on health data to (i) compute the overall proportion of correctly identified records, and
(ii) assess whether it indicated weakness in current anonymisation methods as used with
health data. On average, approximately a quarter of the records were reidentified across all
studies. They concluded the evidence showed a high reidentification rate, but that this was
mostly based on small-scale studies on data that were not anonymised according to
existing standards. This evidence is insufficient to draw general conclusions about the
efficacy of anonymisation methods.
Recent academic work has focused on new forms of data. For example, genomics data
(Malin and Sweeney 2004; Gymrek et al. 2013) and social network data (Backstrom et al.
2007; Narayanan and Shmatikov 2009) have both come under the spotlight; the general
conclusion drawn is that the more complex the form of data, the more vulnerable those
data are to reidentification attacks.
The practical importance of these studies has been to show that care is required before
data is released, particularly if it is to be released as open data. Examples where such care
has not been exercised have led to the third (demonstrative) type of reidentification study.
A particularly notorious example of a demonstrative study arose from the release of a
database of supposedly anonymised movie ratings by Netflix. The data were released in an
attempt to improve its movie recommendations algorithm through crowdsourcing the
problem, offering a $1 million prize for the best solution. For each case, a unique
subscriber ID, the movie title, year of release and the date in which the subscriber rated
the movie were given.
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) showed in their study how Netflix users could be
reidentified. They were able to identify (some) users by matching their Netflix reviews
with data from other sites like IMDb (http://www.imdb.com accessed 14/7/15).
Furthermore, they found that if you knew a few movies a Netflix subscriber had rented
in a given time period, you could reverse engineer the data and find out the rest of their
viewing history. They concluded that very little auxiliary information is needed to
de-anonymise an average subscriber record from the Netflix Prize dataset. With eight
movie ratings (of which two may be completely wrong) and dates that may have a 14-day
error, 99% of records can be uniquely identified in the dataset. For a 68% hit rate, two
ratings and dates (with a three-day error) are sufficient.
The Netflix example and similar demonstrative studies involving AOL search data
(in 2006), the New York taxi cab dataset (in 2014) and Transport for London bike journey
data (in 2014) demonstrate the difficulties of releasing datasets that have not been
thoroughly tested for reidentification risk as open data, and in particular they demonstrate
the value of defensive reidentification tests.
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3. Motivation for the Response Knowledge Scenario
The initial focus of the Phase 1 work was to consider a range of different materials
including:
1) The Data Protection Act (1998).
2) The OGD licence.
3) The EUL licence.
4) A document provided by ONS detailing their view of the differences between the
OGD and EUL licences.
5) The Anonymisation Code of Practice produced by the UK Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO).
6) The standard confidentiality pledge provided by ONS to respondents.
7) The UK Government Statistica Service (GSS) Disclosure Control policy for
Microdata Produced from Social Surveys.
Analysis focused on differences in the data environment in which data would exist under
the two different licence forms. This has been embedded in developments of our thinking
about both the relationship between statistical and legal confidentiality and the
conceptualisation of the data environment (see Mackey and Elliot 2013; Elliot and
Mackey 2014).
The analysis presented here is somewhat different from an orthodox disclosure risk
analysis. During this phase we were trying to build a well-grounded description of the
problem, its attributes and the likely and plausible consequences of a decision to change
the licensing for the current EUL datasets.
3.1. Understanding the Differences Between the Licences
There are considerable differences between the EUL and OGD licences. An analysis of the
licences led us to the conclusion that the following differences impact on the disclosure
risk either directly or indirectly.
Restrictions on use: Clause 2 of the standard EUL provides a fairly tight definition of
how the data may be processed. The OGD licence provides no restriction. As we shall see
later, this is a critical factor in creating new disclosure scenarios.
Restrictions on sharing: EUL Clause 6 restricts sharing to other EUL holders (which in
effect means that data can only be shared with those who already have access to it). The
OGD licence (of course) places no restrictions on sharing.
Preservation of confidentiality: EUL Clause 8 imposes a specific responsibility on
users to preserve respondent confidentiality. It also specifically prohibits deliberate
statistical disclosure. The OGD licence does not provide any such responsibility, relying
only on the Data Protection Act. The OGD license does refer to compliance with the
European Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications. However, this
Directive does not concern individual data of the type that is in question here and therefore
it is ignored henceforth.
It should be noted that the EUL does not explicitly prohibit identification (of oneself
or others). However, it is hard to construct a reasonable use case where identification
(of oneself or others) does not breach Clause 2 and it is hard to construct a plausible
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scenario of identification of others which does not breach Clause 8. We consider therefore
that identification is, for practical purposes, implicitly prohibited by the EUL.
3.2. Key Points of Interpretation of the Data Protection Act
The Data Protection Act (DPA) concerns personal data. In general, the processes of
anonymisation and statistical disclosure control are designed to render the data non-
personal. Personal data are defined in the DPA as data which relate to a living individual
who can be identified either:
a. from that data, or
b. from that data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to
come into the possession of, the data controller.
De-identified data – where the formal identifiers have been removed or masked – is no
longer identified but may still be identifiable. The first clause clearly does not apply to
de-identified data and therefore Clause b is our concern. The key point about Clause b is
that it is contextual. One cannot make judgements about whether data is personal or not
simply by considering the data itself. Whether the data is personal or not will depend upon
the environment in which it resides. Each data environment has attributes which affect
the personal/non-personal nature of the individual-level data contained within it. These
include:
. Other data. It is explicit in the definition of “personal data” that other data is relevant.
. Data users. Data users have identifying knowledge of other individuals. They also
move between data environments and carry information with them as they do so.
Users have varying levels of expertise that make them more or less able to carry out
the necessary data processes to enact identification.
. Data security. The better the security with which data is kept, the stronger the
partition between the data environment and other data environments.
. Governance structures and processes (including licences). Governance processes
create expectations about what may be reasonably done with the data. Some
processing of data will make it more likely that the data will become personal.
. The intra-environment ethos. The prevailing ethos within a data environment will
affect the practice of interacting with data. Behaviour and attitudes which are not
necessarily precisely specified in licences come into play here. Does the prevailing
ethos specify that one should look after data?
It is fairly clear that for all of the above attributes, an OGD licence increases the likelihood
that a given dataset which relates to living individuals will be regarded as personal data
because the probability of identification will be higher:
. Other data. The OG data effectively exist in the global data environment and
therefore in principle could be linked to any other data. Under EUL the data could
only possibly be linked to data that the researchers who are using it have access to.
. Data users: The user base will increase massively under an OGD licence compared to
the EUL licence (this is the point of OGD).
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. Data security. By definition there is no security with OG data – the data is open. EUL
data exist in relatively controlled research environments (although these are not high
security).
. Governance structures and processes (including licences). With the OGD licence, the
data is unregulated as the licence is deliberately permissive; there are very few
restrictions on data processes. The EUL places restrictions on what a researcher may
or may not do.
. The intra-environment ethos. In the global data environment, it is probably fair to say
that there is no one coherent ethos and the full range of behaviours in respect of data
can be expected. In the EUL environment there is a prevailing expectation that
researchers will look after data.
In essence, it is thus clear from this surface analysis that for survey microdata the OGD
licence can only increase the risk that data is personal, which leaves us with the question
of: by how much?
3.3. The OGD User Base
The overarching principle of OG data is to increase the accessibility of government data.
Increased accessibility means a larger user base; larger in number with a greater diversity
in types of users. Ignoring any other impacts of the OGD licence, this must increase the
risk of a disclosure event. Assuming the risk is non-zero with the population of EUL
users and assuming that all users are equal in terms of their risk impact, then the
probability of an attempt will increase in proportion to the increase in the size of the user
base. It is certainly open to discussion whether the OGD user groups are more or less
risky than the EUL ones but, given that the latter is essentially a subset of the former, it is
difficult to argue against the proposition that the risk would increase with the increase in
size of the user base.
If this were the only problem then the increase in risk attributable to users could be
managed through the orthodox trade-off mechanism – by applying more stringent
disclosure control to the data. However, the problem is far more difficult than this. The
OGD licence changes the nature of the disclosure risk problem, creating a whole new type
of disclosure scenario.
3.4. Open Government Data Disclosure Scenarios
Work on attack scenarios for survey data includes Paass (1988) and Elliot and Dale (1999).
Orthodox scenarios include database cross match (where two databases are linked) and
fishing (where the intruder identifiers outliers in the data and then attempts to find those
individuals in the population). When considering what additional disclosure scenarios are
in scope under OGD but are not in scope under EUL, we are not concerned with technical
possibility. Technically, there is nothing that a user could not do under EUL that one could
do under the OGD licence. However, the licences do create formal (quasi-legal)
restrictions on activity and this restriction significantly affects the shape of the data
environment.
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We considered six different scenarios in our analysis at this stage:
1. Self-identification
2. Spontaneous recognition
3. Spontaneous recognition augmented by subsequent response knowledge
4. Commercial data augmentation
5. Response knowledge with collusion
6. Response knowledge without collusion
There is not sufficient space to consider all of these here; suffice it to say that we
considered the sixth to be the most problematic.
3.4.1. Response Knowledge of Others
Response knowledge attacks are where users who know that a particular respondent is in
the OGD dataset and also have other knowledge about them use the combination of that
knowledge to identify the respondent. Here we are considering a data environment that is
effectively just the user themselves. In this environment and scenario, the respondent’s
data is personal for the user, because they have data that allow them to identify the respondent.
Given this, there is a question of whether the identification process itself constitutes a
breach of the DPA. Specifically, can a user be deemed to be unfairly processing data by
identifying a record in a dataset? Such an identification process does not change the status
of the record concerned – it was personal and it still is. The only difference is that
the user now knows precisely which record is the data for the respondent. They may not
have even learnt anything new about the respondent. The scope of what constitutes
“processing” within the DPA is broad and includes “alignment” and “combination”,
which identification processes could be said to constitute, but it is unclear about whether
identification in this case would be deemed unfair or not.
The wording of the OGD licence confuses things further. It states that “you are free
to exploit the information commercially by for example combining it with other
information”. Although we are not primarily concerned with commercial enterprise in this
scenario description, the user could, with some justification, argue that s/he is not doing
any more than the licence says that s/he is allowed to do.
At this stage in the process we consulted the UK Information Commissioner’s Office
and the ensuing discussion led to the fairly clear interpretation that the mere act of
identification did not in itself constitute a breach of the DPA and did not in itself mean the
user becomes a data controller. In the UK Data Protection Act (1998) the term data
controller means “a person who – either alone or jointly or in common with other persons
– determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are
to be processed”. Similarly, EU Directive 95/46/EC defines it as: “the natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”
Of course the above situation would be radically transformed depending on what the
user decides to do next. Game theoretically they have at least seven choices:
1. Do nothing
2. Use information disclosed about the respondent for some secondary purpose
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3. Inform the respondent
4. Inform the data provider
5. Inform the information commissioner
6. Publicise the breach in some way
7. Some combination of the above in parallel or in sequence.
Each of these will lead to complex games with different combinations of players and each
has different legal and material consequences. Specifically, some of them could lead to the
user becoming a data controller. Full analysis of this would require a significant piece of
work using Mackey’s (2009); Mackey and Elliot (2010) game-theoretic framework and
was beyond the scope of this project. However, it seems plausible that a user who accesses
OG data and uses response knowledge to identify a respondent in that data could avoid any
significant costs through careful strategy selection.
To summarise: (i) with EUL data the expected number of users with response
knowledge will be small and the users are constrained from reidentification by the licence
(and possibly sanctions), but (ii) with the OGD licence the number of potential users is
greater by several orders of magnitude and therefore the number of expected potential
users with response knowledge is also much greater. The OGD licence does not constrain
the user from reidentification and it appears that they would not be constrained by the DPA
until after the identification had occurred.
Given that response knowledge attacks are intrinsically higher risk than any orthodox
attack scenario, these became the basis for our penetration test.
4. Methodological Approach to the Penetration Test
Prior to the research taking place, the approach was scrutinised closely by the ONS Ethics
Committee. The Committee included a legal representative, senior staff with knowledge
of social surveys and others with considerable experience of ethical issues in research. The
Committee considered the experience of the researchers, in particular the fact that they had
carried out research with ONS in the past, and had previously handled sensitive data
appropriately. There is also a long-standing data-handling agreement between ONS and
the University of Manchester regarding the latters’s secure lab for disclosive data. We had
also received written confirmation from the ONS Information Asset Owner for this work to
go ahead. ONS Legal Services provided assurances on the legality of carrying out this
research under the Statistics and Registration Service Act (SRSA), Section 38: “Use of
information by the Board”.
ONS staff extracted a set of fifty respondents from each of the surveys at random but
excluded respondents who had not consented to further research. Respondents were
selected from outside the researchers’ areas of residence, in order that no respondent
would be known to any of the researchers. These two files were passed to the attack
simulation team at Manchester University under strict conditions, in particular that the
files must be kept secure, must not be passed to anyone outside the immediate research
team, and must be destroyed at the end of the work. The files were transferred securely by
courier, the data encrypted and password protected. There was an additional proviso that,
for the purposes of this research only, the researchers could attempt to identify individual
respondents in the EUL files. The two files were:
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The LFS ID file consisting of a list of 50 names, addresses and phone numbers.
The LCF ID file consisting of a list of addresses only.
The simulation consisted of four phases:
i) A search phase where intensive web-based searching was conducted on each of the
100 identifiers. On average, half a day of researchers’ time per identifier was spent
on this.
ii) Commercial data was purchased from a lifestyle database company corresponding to
each of the 100 addresses in the identification files.
iii) The resultant information was matched against the microdata and reidentification
attempted.
iv) The matches were verified by ONS.
4.1. The Search Process
In this section we describe the search method and recording system that we used. An initial
pilot search was undertaken and the search toolset refined in order to maximise the data
returns relative to the search effort involved.
For the cases in the LFS ID file it was necessary to verify whether the named respondent
was resident at the property and in the case of the LCF ID file to identify all residents at the
property at the time of the survey. For both identification files, attempts were made to
gather data on all cases, including the hierarchical structure of the household. At least
basic details were successfully gathered on most cases, such as approximate age and/or
names of (at least some of) the other household members. On average, in the first round of
searches each of the 100 cases had about three hours search time allocated to it. In the
second round of searching, ten cases from each file were identified as worthy of extended
search time, because the initial search indicated that they were highly visible and therefore
more information about them was likely to be found. These cases received an additional
3–5 hours of search time.
4.1.1. Design Process
A search database was developed in order to systemise the search and to maximise the
return relative to effort. An Excel workbook was created for each individual case.
There are a number of inherent biases associated with the use of different search
engines. These biases include ranking metrics (Vaughan and Thelwall 2004; Vaughn and
Zhang 2007; Bar-Ilan et al. 2009), business links associated with the searched sites and
‘pay to promote’ or sponsored search return services versus organic search results (Ma
et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011; Tarantino 2013). Some business and subscription-based
websites will use this feature, thereby skewing the search results. Other sites, or individual
users of sites, may opt to have their associated data blocked, restricted or removed from
search engine rankings, thereby skewing data results further. Using multiple search
engines does however increase the information returned. This was achieved by using
meta-search tools, a selection of search engines and direct searches of specific sites such as
Facebook, LinkedIn, 192 and ancestry search sites. These are detailed in the appendix.
Several test runs were carried out on pilot data to: (i) minimise the search tools used,
(ii) maximise the likelihood of positive returns, and (iii) check accuracy. The most
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important initial search source was 192 as this supported the cross-referencing of names
with addresses and provided an age bracket, all essential basic information to assist further
searching.
4.1.2. People and Business Search Tool – 192
For this crucial search tool the following information was retrieved: name, address,
estimated age, estimated length of residence, data gathered from the electoral roll, recent
nearby house sale prices, business details and director report information.
A recent addition to the data that one can obtain from 192 is a ‘background report’
on each household resident. This report is available at a relatively low cost (£29.94) and
draws information into a single report from a range of public sources, that is, edited
Electoral Register, company house information, D&B company listings, 118 Data
Resources, Local Data Company, Land Registry, Callcredit plc, HALO Mortality file, The
Insolvency Service, and The Registry Trust. The report sets out an individual’s and their
co-residents’ (if any) name, address, length of residence, age in five-year bands, mortality,
their solvency status, disqualified director status, home ownership status and whether they
have any county court judgements against them. Although these sources of information are
publically accessible in the UK, pulling together this information is time consuming and
requires some understanding of where and how to access public data sources and
knowledge of how to cross-reference sources to verify the information obtained. Thus, the
192 background report makes data collection of this type of information significantly
easier. We did not use the reports in our searches but we did purchase several reports to
assess the information they offered.
Other data sources were used to cross-reference the data obtained from 192 or to fill in
the gaps where it was missing. Ancestry UK is a good source of information for gathering
more accurate information on date of birth, marital status and family details. It should be
noted that it was difficult to search for women or children using this site due to the
ambiguity over marital status and married names. Again, if the name is common there will
be too many results to search effectively. It is much more accurate with older people who
have unusual names and who were less likely to migrate.
The land registry was the most reliable source for both verifying residency and home
ownership. It is cheap to use (£3 per search) and has approximately eighty percent
coverage. In terms of public sources, Zoopla was particularly useful for basic property
information, as was Google Maps. With street view one can see the property and
sometimes vehicles and make inferences about affluence and the presence of children.
The cost for using 192 is £89.94 for 100 credits allowing full access. Your credit is
depleted every time you search and even searching with an address and full postcode very
rarely returns a correct match within 192. Typically you need to search multiple times
(approx. 4þ ) and you are likely to need to trawl through potentially very long lists of
similar names and addresses. Credit is depleted very quickly and so 100 credits do not last
very long. Individual background reports can be purchased at a cost of £29.94 each. These
reports bring together information from numerous public sources such as Companies
House and the Individual insolvency register. UK Ancestry was used to corroborate
findings with 192 at a cost of £18.95 per month and was purchased for a period of three
months.
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4.1.3. Social Media
People are becoming more aware about their privacy settings when using social
networking sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn. Recent studies verify that behaviour
in social networking site use is changing and individuals are being encouraged to protect
their privacy from different sources (see, for example Moreno et al. (2012) and Whipple
et al. (2012)). This clearly inhibits intruders gathering information in this way.
With Facebook however, even when security settings are high, it may still be possible to
gather data on location, address, employer, likes, films, pages, groups, to view photos, see
posts by others on a page and so on. There were only a few cases in the study with Facebook
accounts, but those were a good source of contextual information for those cases.
For LinkedIn, if security settings are activated, little information can be seen unless you
are a group member. Searching requires registration and a tracing tool is used which lets
a person know when you have searched for them. When the security settings are not
activated a range of information is potentially available, such as workplace location, job
type/title and education. We found a small number of cases where the privacy settings
were not activated.
4.1.4. Difficulties Associated With the Search Strategy
It should be noted that searching in the manner described above is not without its
difficulties and/or limitations. With our key search tool 192 we encountered problems:
Stability of the information: Searching within 192 does not always return the exact
address/name, and multiple attempts were sometimes needed. We found that searching
outside 192, via Google for example, was more reliable but then you have to pay to view
any information beyond address and name. It is worth noting that there is a cost for each
search on 192.
Inaccuracy of information: We found conflicting name and age profile data for a small
number of our cases, where several results were returned for similar addresses with the same
person and co-residents named but with contrasting age profiles. These inaccuracies made it
difficult to be confident about the data as there was no way to cross-check for accuracy.
Similarly, the data on directors was not always reliable when cross-referenced with business
directory sources. Common names, names associated with famous people or ambiguous
names, such as those that represent objects, were difficult to search as they produced a large
number of returns that were difficult to cross-check for accuracy (given the time contstrains).
In terms of specific groups, it is more difficult to search for middle-aged women,
especially if their marital status is unclear or unknown. Often once a ‘husband’ is identified
it is easier to confirm the woman’s identity, including date of birth and so on, by tracing
her through her husband’s marriage records. This is often the only way to track a woman’s
birth record. Even if there are children, this group of women can be difficult to identify
without knowing their maiden name to check the birth records against.
Beyond the search limitations there are two other research issues that are worth noting.
The first of these is time – or more specifically, the search time used in this study. It is
entirely possible that an intruder would be willing to spend more time searching than we
did and it would seem more likely that the search frame would be much smaller than our
100 cases.
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A second point worth making in relation to our search strategy relates to the issue of
who is online, and thus who is more likely to be captured. Studies have shown that people
from different age cohorts use the Internet in different ways and develop online trust in
dissimilar ways (Obal and Kunz 2013). Fewer older people have online social media
accounts, and those that do tend to either use them infrequently or have very little
information associated with them.
4.2. The Commercial Data Purchase
As well as searching public data sources online for information for the 100 cases in the
identification files, we also purchased commercial data from the UK lifestyle data
company, CACI. The rationale for this was twofold: (i) to consider what additional
information might be available through this route, and (ii) to develop first-hand knowledge
and experience of the process of obtaining commercial data.
In terms of the second rationale there were two constraints, the first of which was cost.
The minimum purchase from CACI is £1,200, which will get you up to 1,000 names and
addresses. It typically costs thousands of pounds to access any variables associated with the
names and addresses purchased and the number of variables given is usually limited to
between 5 and 20. This makes it unlikely that an intruder searching for a single case is likely
to consider purchasing this type of data.
The second constraint relates to the purchasing process itself, which is time consuming
and requires several screening stages. The first stage requires that you explain why you
want to purchase data. At the next stage, you are allocated an account manager who
discusses at length why you want the data and negotiates what variables you can have
access to and for what time period. The final stage requires you to sign a contract outlining
the cost involved, the variables and cases requested and the intended use. Accessing the
data took several weeks and many emails and phone calls. The length of this process and
the hoops that the user is required to go through on top of the cost are likely to deter all but
the most determined intruder.
We informed CACI that we wanted to purchase data for a study looking at what
information they held and what disclosure risk (if any) it might pose. We were able to
negotiate for the minimum order value the names and addresses for Sample 1 and 2 and
those of any other residents at the properties. We were also given all the variables held on
each resident at the 100 households. The available variables can be summarised in the
three categories: demographic, lifestyle, and socioeconomic.
The key variables present in the dataset and considered useful for matching purposes
were: age (five-year bands), sex of each adult, number of children in household, number of
bedrooms, social grade, course occupational grouping, years at property (four bands),
tenure (three bands), house type, and number of cars (0, 1, 2þ ).
4.3. The Matching Process
We initially explored the idea of using automated matching techniques. However, it was
assumed that the intruder we were simulating was not a technical expert and therefore
using a probability based approach was not realistic.
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Even more importantly, it became evident that a non-automated approach was actually
going to be more productive. An example of why this is the case can be found with Case 4
from the LFS sample. This case threw up an enormous amount of data, some of it
contradictory. In particular, the crucial piece of information about Case 4’s age seemed
unreliable on 192.com. This left us with several possible people who corresponded to Case
4 in the dataset. However, since we knew that Case 4 was in the sample and the
information on Case 4’s marital partner seemed solid, it was possible to look for household
age-relationship combinations that matched Case 4’s spouse’s age (which appeared
reliable). Fortunately most of the combinations were a priori unlikely (large age
differences) and only one threw up an actual match. This was then checked for against
other information about both Case 4 and his spouse.
In other cases where we found multiple matches on the available information, we were
able to examine the dataset to look for an additional variable that differentiated those
matches and then go out to look for information in a more targeted way for the case on that
variable. This ability to go to and fro between the data, the matching information and the
world made the approach much more like a piece of detective work and less like an
orthodox statistical matching process. Because of the ethical and time constraints we were
under on the project, we could not go as far with this as we might have done otherwise.
Once the attack simulation team had reduced the number of possible matches down as
far as they could, they then made an assessment of the certainty of the best matches. This
was essentially a subjective expert judgement but was based on a three factors: (i) the
closeness of the next best match; (ii) prior knowledge of data divergence issues (time lag
between data collection and the survey date, coding mismatches, etc.); and (iii) confidence
in the data we had collected (was the information contradictory, was there doubt over
whether we had found the correct person, etc.). The matcher in fact assigned a score on a
100-point scale to represent their confidence, which roughly translates into a subjective
estimate of the probability of a match being correct. For the purposes of presentation here
this scale is collapsed into High (70–100), Medium (50–69), Low (15–49), and Very low
(0–14). It should be stressed that no algorithm was used here – the confidence level that
was assigned was essentially based on expert judgement by the researcher, taking account
of the above factors. A possible extension of this work would be to investigate whether this
expert judgement is easily convertible into an algorithm. However, here we are simply
concerned with whether matches could be achieved with minimum technical mediation.
The matches were then verified by the ONS team.
5. Matching Results: LFS
5.1. Stage 1: Openly Available Information Only
At Stage 1 we considered only openly available information that we had collected from the
Internet.
In total, matches against nine records were attempted, since for the other 41 cases
insufficient good-quality information was obtained to make a match attempt viable. Of the
nine match attempts, eight produced a correct match, although in two cases it was one of
a multiple match.
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Summary information is given below. The critical point here is that if the matcher’s
confidence was high then the matches were successful. These are invariably cases where
large amounts of good-quality information were obtained.
5.2. Stage 2: Adding in the Commercial Dataset
Before the Stage 1 matches were verified, the process was repeated, this time adding in
the commercial data. This increased the number of correct matches to 14. Adding the
commercial data did not have a completely monotonic effect on the matches; two of the
matches that were correct using only the openly available information were not even
attempted with the commercial data because the commercial data provided contradictory
information, reducing the certainty. This nonmonotonicity may seem counterintuitive
but is related to more a general phenomenon observed, for example by Elliot (2009).
Essentially, increasing information has a diminishing return on the power of a set of key
information (because information about people is correlated) but the impact on data
divergence is linear. So at some point the noise created by the divergence exceeds the
information gain from the increasing key size. Where that point is varies depending on
the level of divergence, the level of correlation between the key variables and the power of
the key variables. On the other hand, fuzzy and probabilistic matching techniques can
reverse the process, trading lower precision for higher recall.
The headline results are that by using the openly available information, six of the 50
records were correctly matched one-to-one (12%). Using the commercial data as well
pushed this up to 14 (28%). These headline figures however disguise a more significant
fact: that the slope of “matchability” is quite steep; the precision rate for high-confidence
matches was 100%. The reason for this steepness is primarily because of the amount and
quality of the information obtained. Another factor was household size.
6. Matching Results: LCF
The process for the LCF matches was slightly different. The file was not hierarchical and
so lacked that defining feature. On the other hand, it did have a low-level geographical
indicator on it: the Output Area Classifier (OAC). Obtaining an OAC from a postcode is
quite easy once you know how to do it, but it is certainly not obvious and would not
necessarily be something that was available to a non-expert. However, a data journalist or
similar should be able to obtain the information. We therefore ran two different scenarios:
with and without the OAC codes. As it turned out, the OAC was an incredibly useful
differentiator key.
The second feature for this dataset was that ONS only provided the simulated attack
team with addresses (no names) and this reduced the certainty of the information, which
was reflected in the confidence levels that we recorded.
A third difference in the process here was that where there were multiple matches of
equal certainty these were recorded as single joint match. For the purpose of comparison,
these are turned into effective confidences by simply dividing the total by the number of
matches.
At Stage 1a (without OAC codes) there were a possible 20 matches against eight
addresses. The mean effective confidence was 16%, which meant that we were predicting
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that we would obtain 3.3 matches. In fact we obtained two. This information is shown in
Table 3. This file looks reasonably safe against this simple attack.
However, when the OAC code is added the situation looks very different, as we can see
in Table 4. A total of 42 matches were made against 27 addresses. 16.55 matches were
predicted to be correct and in fact 18 were. As with the LFS matches, the high-confidence
matches were more likely to be correct.
7. General Discussion
The headline finding of this study is that an intruder could, even with partial response
knowledge (an address) and using only publically available and/or purchasable
information, obtain some correct high-confidence matches without the use of sophistica-
ted matching software. The overall precision rate for high-confidence matches over
Tables 1 to 4 is 91%.
This is an important finding. The data here are fairly standard social survey data and
contain a mixture of mundane and sensitive information. A correct match against either
file would yield income and health information about the target as well as information
about other family members, including children. So beyond the obvious legal
requirements, the data custodian has a clear duty of care to respondents.
There are seven caveats that must be placed on the details of our headline finding. First,
the datasets were older than the public and commercial data (15 months older in the case
of the LFS and 27 months in the case of the LCF). This will have increased the data




attemptedCorrect Incorrect Precision Correct Incorrect
High confidence 5 0 1.00 2 0
Medium
confidence
1 0 1.00 0 0




Overall 6 0 1.00 3 0 41




attemptedCorrect Incorrect Precision Correct Incorrect
High confidence 10 0 1.00 1 0
Medium
confidence
1 1 0.50 0 0




Overall 12 2 0.86 2 2 42
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divergence. In many cases this would have caused a “no match attempted” outcome and
therefore will not have affected rates (against confidence), but it will have affected the
number of matches attempted and this was factored into the overall confidence level.
Second, the person doing the matching was a statistical disclosure control expert. So,
although he restricted himself to unsophisticated manual matching techniques, he was not
able to switch off his understanding of data processes, and in particular concepts such as
rareness and uniqueness. This would have made confidence estimates more accurate than
might be expected for an intruder without that expertise.
Third, the study team was restricted to carrying out legal and ethical actions. We could
not, for example, call the named householder. We drew a strict ethical line around our
search behaviour so we did not, for example, create fake accounts, attempt to befriend
anyone or pose as another person, all of which could potentially yield further information.
We also decided that we would not carry out site visits as this would be potentially
intrusive. A malicious intruder would not be restricted in the same way. Relatedly, a
wealth of technology sources is available to knowledgeable users that could increase the
likelihood of an intruder gaining access to an online account such as Facebook to access
the data. This study did not use any such technology (for a useful background to the issue
of using socialbots to hack social networking accounts, please see Boshmaf et al. 2013).
Fourth, the data gatherer was restricted in time by the need to gather information against
a representative number of cases. An intruder who simply wanted to identify a single
individual could focus a lot more resources on that case.




attemptedCorrect Incorrect Precision Correct Incorrect
High confidence 0 0 – 0 1
Medium
confidence
1 1 0.50 0 1




Overall 1 3 0.25 1 2 42




attemptedCorrect Incorrect Precision Correct Incorrect
High confidence 5 2 0.71 3 1
Medium
confidence
8 0 1.00 1 1




Overall 14 5 0.74 4 4 23
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Fifth, every dataset will be different in terms of its properties (variables, sample size,
data structure, etc.) and those properties will interact with the likelihood of correct
identifications.
Sixth, the study is a snapshot, albeit a compelling one. The availability of data in the
public domain is changing constantly, with the general trend being upwards. This will tend
to increase the risk associated with this type of attack. The importance of this issue is
increased by the fact that any move from EUL to OGD for any given dataset is a one-shot
decision. Once the data are released, then the decision is effectively irreversible.
Seventhly, although we were considering response knowledge we were not able to
mimic the entirety of what an individual might know about a respondent, only what is
available more or less publically. It is likely that an intruder with response knowledge
would also have other personal knowledge about the respondent. A potentially interesting
extension to the current study would involve re-contacting respondents and asking them to
nominate a friend, neighbour, or colleague and then asking the nominee to complete the
survey as if they were the respondent.
Some of these factors mitigate the risks indicated by these findings, while others
exacerbate them. This makes drawing general conclusions from the specifics of the results
reported here hazardous.
Nevertheless, the general shape of the results is indicative that moving the survey
datasets from end user licence to open data, without any change in their content, would
significantly increase the risk of a statistical disclosure on each such dataset and make the
likelihood of a disclosure event far greater. The results of the study presented here do
suggest that the level of detail on geographical variables and the level of information about
household structure are two issues that would need to be attended to in a data-release
decision. The restrictions placed on researchers under the EUL in these two surveys are
therefore necessary in order to deter an attack, and to provide ONS with some sanctions in
case of an attempted or claimed disclosure. As we lay out in Section 3, the response
knowledge scenario makes sense with open data but not with EUL licensing.
The financial resources required for the entire study were modest. The main cost was
the commercial dataset, which cost us £1200; in addition we spent under £100 on ad
hoc services on 192 and the land registry. This works out at an average of £13 per record.
In fact, for the LCF study we ended up not using the commercial data as it did not add any
value, so the costs there were considerably cheaper.
To summarise, the study presented here provides an illustration of the importance of
carrying out well-formulated penetration tests before decisions are made about data
releases, particularly irreversible ones such as the release of a file of individual records as
open data.
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